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Abstract

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good game. In the third part the attitudes of subjects to their partners in the public good game is measured. The concept of social tie is operationalized as the difference between the measurements in the first and third parts. Evidence for the occurrence of social ties is found. These ties depend on the success of the interaction in the public good game.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2000/wp-cesifo-2000-03/cesifo_wp273.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 273.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_273

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Related research

Keywords: Public good; social ties; experiment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
• H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
• A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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1. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 1998. "Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 151-170, Summer.
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15. repec:att:wimass:9006 is not listed on IDEAS
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