How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design
AbstractConventional pension systems suffer from a design defect which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The paper outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2590.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
pension reform; implicit pension taxes and subsidies; child benefits; fertility; labour productivity;
Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Cigno, 2009. "How to avoid a pension crisis: A question of intelligent system design," CHILD Working Papers wp04_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Cigno, Alessandro, 2009. "How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design," IZA Policy Papers 4, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
- J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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CHILD Working Papers
wp02_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Saving pensions with conditional benefits
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-05-12 14:15:00
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