Privatization under Asymmetric Information
AbstractThis paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 244.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Privatization; asymmetric information;
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