In the context of a two-tier pension system, with a pay-as-you-go first tier and a fully funded second tier, we demonstrate that a system with a defined wage-indexed second tier performs strictly better than one with a defined contribution or defined real benefit second tier. The former completely separates systematic redistribution (confined to the first tier) from intergenerational risk sharing (the role of the second tier). This way labor supply is undistorted.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2185.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Piero Gottardi & Felix Kubler, 2006.
"Social Security and Risk Sharing,"
Working Papers
2006_38, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics.
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