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Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?

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  • Alessandro Cigno

Abstract

A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably reduces the marginal return to labour, and will thus discourage labour. A Bismarckian scheme can do so only if it is not actuarially fair, or in the presence of credit rationing. In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour less if the scheme is Bismarckian than if it is Beveridgean. A Bismarckian scheme may even encourage labour.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2006/wp-cesifo-2006-08/cesifo1_wp1772.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1772.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1772

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Keywords: tax wedge; labour; public pensions; Bismarck; Beveridge; implicit pension tax;

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References

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  1. Borsch-Supan, Axel & Reil-Held, Anette, 2001. " How Much Is Transfer and How Much Is Insurance in a Pay-As-You-Go System? The German Case," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(3), pages 505-24, September.
  2. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 47-104, 04.
  3. Del Boca, Daniela & Lusardi, Annamaria, 2003. "Credit market constraints and labor market decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(6), pages 681-703, December.
  4. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," NBER Working Papers 4810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1978. "A model of social security and retirement decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 337-360, December.
  6. Robert Fenge & Martin Werding, 2004. "Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countries," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 25(2), pages 159-200, June.
  7. Cigno, Alessandro & Rosati, Furio C., 1996. "Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: Theory, and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK and USA," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1561-1589, November.
  8. Jappelli, Tullio, 1990. "Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 219-34, February.
  9. Murphy, Kevin M & Welch, Finis, 1998. "Perspectives on the Social Security Crisis and Proposed Solutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 142-50, May.
  10. Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," Scholarly Articles 4553027, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Alessandro Cigno & Luca Casolaro & Furio C. Rosati, 2002. "The Impact of Social Security on Saving and Fertility in Germany," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(2), pages 189-, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Heijdra, B.J. & Ligthart, J.E., 2005. "Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition and Finite Lives," Discussion Paper 2005-126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Carone, Giuseppe & Nicodème, Gaëtan & Schmidt, Jan, 2007. "Tax revenues in the European Union: Recent trends and challenges ahead," MPRA Paper 3996, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Carlos Vidal-Meli� & María del Carmen Boado-Penas, 2013. "Compiling the actuarial balance for pay-as-you-go pension systems. Is it better to use the hidden asset or the contribution asset?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(10), pages 1303-1320, April.
  4. Gilles Le Garrec, 2012. "Social security and growth in an agin economy: the case of actuarial fairness," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2012-18, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  5. Fisher, Walter H. & Keuschnigg, Christian, 2011. "Life-Cycle Unemployment, Retirement, and Parametric Pension Reform," Economics Series 267, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  6. Kerstin Roeder, 2009. "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents," Working Papers 2009/28, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  7. Alessandro Cigno, 2009. "How to avoid a pension crisis: A question of intelligent system design," CHILD Working Papers wp04_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  8. Gilles Le Garrec & Stéphane Lhuissier, 2011. "Life expectancy, heavy work and the return to education: lessons for the social security reform," Sciences Po publications 2011-18, Sciences Po.
  9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09hi6860cc6 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Gilles Le Garrec & Stéphane Lhuissier, 2011. "Life expectancy, heavy work and return to education ; lessons for the social security reform," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2011-18, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).

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