Health Values, Preference Inconsistency, and Insurance Demand
Abstract
Several empirical studies provide evidence that their actual health state affects people’s attitudes towards health and medical care in hypothetical health states. In the tradition of behavioural economics this paper considers the actual health state as a point of reference and builds a model for studying the implications of this phenomenon on health insurance and on demand for medical care. It considers the insurance demand of different types of agents: naive individuals, individuals who are able to commit to medical care demand and sophisticated individuals. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether inconsistency of preferences reinforces or tones down moral hazard problems.Download Info
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1634.Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1634
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Related research
Keywords: health insurance; medical care; health state; behavioural economics; prospect theory; time inconsistency;This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2006-01-29 (Finance)
- NEP-HEA-2006-01-29 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2006-01-29 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2006-01-29 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006.
"Long Persuasion Games,"
THEMA Working Papers
2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
- Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/179, Université Paris-Dauphine.
- Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/167, Université Paris-Dauphine.
- Heijdra, Ben J. & Ligthart, Jenny E., 2010.
"The Transitional Dynamics Of Fiscal Policy In Small Open Economies,"
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 1-28, February.
- Heijdra, B.J. & Ligthart, J.E., 2006. "The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in Small Open Economies," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-199394, Tilburg University.
- Ben J. Heijdra & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in Small Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1777, CESifo Group Munich.
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