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The Evolution of Public Spending on Higher Education in a Democracy

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  • Alexander Haupt

Abstract

This paper analyses political forces that cause an initial expansion of public spending on higher education and an ensuing decline in subsidies. Growing public expenditures increase the future size of the higher income class and thus boost future demand for education. This demand shift implies that the initial subsidy per student becomes too expensive to be politically sustainable. Despite a voters’ backlash that curbs education subsidies, overall enrolments continue to rise. But the participation rate of the children of lower income families, that went up in the expansion period, declines over time, both in absolute terms and relative to the rate of their counterparts from higher income households.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1631.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1631

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Keywords: higher education; voting; social stratification; social mobility; overlapping generations;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Alexander Haupt & Silke Uebelmesser, 2009. "Voting on Labour-Market Integration and Education Policy when Citizens Differ in Mobility and Ability," CESifo Working Paper Series 2588, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Anderberg, Dan, 2013. "Post-compulsory education: Participation and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 134-150.

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