Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations
AbstractAlthough reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can claim any part of player 2's resources, and player 2 can react by destroying some (or all) of these resources thus preventing their transfer to player 1. Both physiological and self-report measures were related to destruction decisions and expectations. The pattern of emotional arousal and its correlation with self-reported anger highlights the importance of using both techniques for studying reciprocity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1298.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
emotions; bargaining; laboratory experiment; expectations; reciprocity; physiological arousal; self-report measures of emotions;
Other versions of this item:
- Gershon Ben-Shakhar & Gary Bornstein & Astrid Hopfensitz & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-099/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2004-11-07 (Business Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2004-11-07 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2004-11-07 (Experimental Economics)
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