Not sufficiently harmonised national pension systems within the European Union distort the allocation of labour and endanger redistributive activities. This paper identifies the most decentralised level of harmonisation which guarantees efficient allocation and enables redistribution. For this, we build on theoretical results to evaluate the realised distribution of the legal power between the European Union and the Member States and the resulting level of harmonisation. We find that harmonisation is sub-optimally low. Binding rules guaranteed by the European Union are needed which means that the Member States have to concede more fundamental responsibilities to the European Union.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 1108.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law N34 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Income, and Wealth - - - Europe: 1913-
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