Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement in a Software Duopoly
AbstractWe study the economic impacts of the interaction between a regulator's Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection policy against software piracy on the one side and the forms of IPR protection that software producers may themselves undertake to protect their intellectual property on the other side. Two developers, each offering a variety of different quality, compete for heterogeneous users who choose among purchasing a legal version, using an illegal copy, and not using a product at all. Using an illegal version violates IPR and is thus punishable when disclosed. If a developer considers the level of piracy as high, he can either introduce a form of physical protection for his product or introduce a protection in the form of restricting support and other services to illegal users. The quality of each developer's product is exogenously given, and the developers compete in prices. We examine the above issues within the framework of Bertrand and Stackelberg competition while the monopoly set-up serves as a point of reference.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp435.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
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vertically differentiated duopoly; software piracy; Bertrand competition; private and public intellectual property rights protection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- O25 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-03-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-03-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2011-03-26 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-03-26 (Intellectual Property Rights)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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