Corruption, Voting and Employment Status: Evidence from Russian Parliamentary Elections
AbstractThis paper examines to what extent the distribution of votes and voting behavior of people with different employment status are affected by regional differences in corruption. Using data from the Russian Parliamentary (State Duma) Elections 1999 and 2003, I develop and estimate a SUR system of equations which takes into account specific features of the Russian electoral system. The paper distinguishes between hard and perceived measures of corruption and analyzes the effects of corruption on the voting shares of particular parties and on voters' participation in elections. Additionally, a series of Monte Carlo simulations are performed to analyze the effects of corruption on the distribution of votes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp428.
Date of creation: Dec 2010
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-12-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CMP-2010-12-23 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-12-23 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-12-23 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-12-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-TRA-2010-12-23 (Transition Economics)
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