The paper analyzes the essential properties of bidder equilibrium strategies in the multi-unit uniform-price auction. In the auction the seller offers several identical units for sale, specifies a minimum accepted bid (reservation price) and sets maximum number of bids that any bidder can submit. Under these restrictions bidders use strictly increasing strategies in a symmetric equilibrium more often, and in many cases the reservation price increases the bidder's strategy which is typical in single-unit auctions. Such an auction procedure implies a unique equilibrium strategy in some cases. Thus the number of bid restriction and reservation price present in real-life multi-unit auctions restore some properties of equilibrium strategies typical for single-unit auctions.
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Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number
wp354.