Sequencing of Club Enlargement: "big bang," "gradualism," and internal reform
AbstractIn an incomplete contract framework, I analyse how a club chooses its enlargement strategy in the presence of congestion. The club faces two waves of applicants. The applicants are homogeneous within each wave but differ in their conformity to the club's standards across waves. For each wave, the club chooses between an early entry offer, when the club can enforce the applicant's reform, and a late entry offer, when the applicant has to reform itself in order to be admitted. In addition, the club undertakes its own internal reform which, if successful, can eliminate congestion. I show that the club uses the "gradualism" approach (admitting waves sequentially) when the waves substantially differ in their compliance with the club's standards, and the "big bang" approach (admitting waves simultaneously) otherwise. Moreover, the club never admits a less advanced wave before a more advanced one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp232.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
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Transition; Club theory; Incomplete contracts.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus Wallner & Mike Burkart, 2000.
"Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance,"
FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group
dp359, Financial Markets Group.
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