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Effect of Enterpise Break-Ups on Performance: Case of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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  • Polona Domadenik
  • Lubomir Lizal
  • Marko Pahor

Abstract

The empirical transition literature on the comparison of restructuring prior to privatization is quite limited. Macedonia is a specific case among transition economies where a large number of break-ups occurred at the beginning of privatization. Using firm-level data, we estimate the effects of the break-ups of enterprises on the subsequent performance of the “master enterprises” and spun off divisions during the period of privatization. We estimate the performance effects by comparing the performance of enterprises that remained intact to the performance of enterprises that experienced spin-offs and the newly established subsidiaries. The goal is to provide empirical evidence on the issue of the effect of pre-privatization restructuring. Our results suggest that the breakups were not guided by efficiency or performance goals but rather managerial self-interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Polona Domadenik & Lubomir Lizal & Marko Pahor, 2003. "Effect of Enterpise Break-Ups on Performance: Case of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp216, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp216
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    Cited by:

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    3. Robert Ambrisko & Vitezslav Augusta & Jan Babecky & Michal Franta & Dana Hajkova & Petr Kral & Jan Libich & Pavla Netusilova & Milan Rikovsky & Jakub Rysanek & Pavel Soukup & Petr Stehlik & Vilem Vale, 2013. "Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 2, volume 11, number rb11/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Kamil Galuscak, January.
    4. Jose Peydro Alcalde & Sona Benecka & Alexis Derviz & Adam Gersl & Tomas Holub & Roman Horvath & Petr Jakubik & Narcisa Liliana Kadlcakova & Dorota Kowalczyk & Ivana Kubicova & Steven Ongena & Jakub Ry, 2012. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 2, volume 10, number rb10/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Roman Horvath, January.
    5. Lazareva Olga, "undated". "Adjusting Boundaries of Russian Firms," EERC Working Paper Series 04-08e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    6. Kamil Galuscak & Adam Gersl & Marcela Gronychova & Petr Hlavac & Petr Jakubik & Lubos Komarek & Zlatuse Komarkova & Tomas Konecny & Jakub Seidler, 2014. "Stress-Testing Analyses of the Czech Financial System," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 1, volume 12, number rb12/1 edited by Jan Babecky & Roman Horvath, January.
    7. Jaromir Baxa & Michal Franta & Tomas Havranek & Roman Horvath & Miroslav Plasil & Marek Rusnak & Borek Vasicek, 2013. "Transmission of Monetary Policy," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 1, volume 11, number rb11/1 edited by Jan Babecky & Roman Horvath, January.

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    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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