Large public bureaucracies are usually less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explains how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. In fact, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization can enhance productivity by preventing collusion between middle managers and line workers; provided that collusion has a negative effect on the organization's surplus and takes place in conditions of asymmetric information
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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series with number
303.
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