The Governance of Exchanges: Members Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership
AbstractThe paper compares co-operative governance structure to outside ownership. The distinction between the two lies in who has residual rights of control. It is found that a co-operative becomes relatively less efficient as the environment becomes more competitive, and the interests of members become more skewed. These ideas are applied to the governance of exchanges.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series with number 292.
Date of creation: 1996
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Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp
Other versions of this item:
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
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