Capacity Constraints and Irreversible Investments: Defending Against Collective Dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl
AbstractScrutiny of potential mergers by the European Commission often focuses on unilateral effects or single firm dominance. But some cases have involved concerns over coordinated effects: the concern that the merger could increase the likelihood of consumer harm through tacit collusion by the reduced number of firms in the industry (this is known as collective dominance). The economic and legal issues are far less certain in these cases and a particular challenge is how to bring empirical evidence to bear on the decision. In this chapter we examine a case in newsprint and magazine paper - UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl . Here, coordinated effects were at the centre of the Commission's concerns. We discuss how collusion theory and evidence were used to help clear the merger without remedies in the final Decision.
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Date of creation: Feb 2008
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- Kai-Uwe Kühn & John Van Reenen, 2008. "Capacity constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4437, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- L73 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Forest Products
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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