Monitoring Colleagues at Work: Profit-Sharing, Employee Ownership, Broad-Based Stock Options and Workplace Performance in the United States
AbstractThis study seeks to increase our understanding of worker reactions to shirking by analyzing two new questionson shirking from the 2002 General Social Science Survey (GSS). We developed the questions in order toilluminate the factors that enable some shared capitalist enterprises to overcome the free rider or 1/N dilemma.Our guiding principle is the notion that for profit-sharing, worker ownership, and broad-based stock options toproduce economic benefits, workers must "buy into" shared arrangements and create a workplace culture thatdiscourages shirking.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0647.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Profit Sharing: Does It Make a Difference?," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ps, October.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Jones, Derek C & Kato, Takao, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 391-414, June.
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1989.
"Peer Pressure And Partnership,"
e-89-5, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Leigh Tesfatsion, 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics," Computational Economics 0203001, EconWPA, revised 15 Aug 2002.
- Leibowitz, Arleen & Tollison, Robert, 1980. "Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in Legal Partnerships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 380-94, July.
- Michael Prietula & Kathleen Carley & Les Gasser (ed.), 1998. "Simulating Organizations: Computational Models of Institutions and Groups," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026266108x, June.
- Joseph Blasi & Michael Conte & Douglas Kruse, 1996. "Employee stock ownership and corporate performance among public companies," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 60-79, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
- John Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn & Georgi Tsertsvadze, 2005. "Does profit sharing reduce conflict with the boss? Evidence from Germany," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 235-250.
- Derek C. Jones & Srecko Goic, 2010. "Do Innovative Workplace Practices Foster Mutual Gains? Evidence From Croatia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp993, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.