This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Matchmaking: the Influence of Monitoring Environments on the Effectiveness of Performance Pay Systems

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Richard Belfield
David Marsden

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This study uses cross-section and panel data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey to explore contextual influences on the relationship between performance-related pay (PRP) and organizational performance. While it finds strong evidence that the use of PRP can enhance performance outcomes, it also determines that this relationship is qualified by the structure of workplace monitoring environments. In addition, it presents evidence that managers learn about optimum combinations of pay system and monitoring environment through a process of experimentation. Lastly, although there exists a robust positive association in these data between use of PRP and pay inequality, it appears that these higher levels of inequality carry no performance penalty.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/DP0543.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number 0543.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:0543

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: performance-related pay incentives performance measurement organizational commitment

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. D Metcalf & K Hansen & A Charlwood, 2000. "Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay," CEP Discussion Papers 0452, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. D Marsden & R Richardson, 1992. "Motivation and Performance Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Case Study of the Inland Revenue," CEP Discussion Papers 075, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  3. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Levine, David I., 1991. "Cohesiveness, productivity, and wage dispersion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 237-255, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David Marsden & Stephen French & Katsuyuki Kubo, 2001. "Does Performance Pay De-Motivate, and Does It Matter?," CEP Discussion Papers 0503, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  8. Machin, Stephen & Stewart, Mark, 1996. "Trade Unions and Financial Performance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 213-41, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.