Damages for Breach of Contract, Impossibility of Performance and Legal Enforceability
AbstractThis paper develops a game-theoretic model of a contract between a creditor and a debtor where equilibrium depends on the damage rule chosen for breach-of-contract situations, the use of impossibility-of-performance excuses and the level of legal contract enforceability. We find that, under perfect legal enforceability, the different alternative damage rules (based on expectation or reliance damages, with or without performance excuses) are able to induce an efficient performance by the contracting parties. But we also find that, if legal enforceability is imperfect, then a rule based on expectation damages with an excuse for impossibility of performance is able to work more efficiently than the other alternative damage rules.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 357.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Av. Córdoba 374, (C1054AAP) Capital Federal
Phone: (5411) 6314-3000
Fax: (5411) 4314-1654
Web page: http://www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/doc_trabajo.html
More information through EDIRC
breach of contact; impossibility of performance; legal enforceability;
Other versions of this item:
- German Coloma, 2008. "Damages for Breach of Contract, Impossibility of Performance and Legal Enforceability," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 5.
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2007-10-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-10-13 (Regulation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statistics
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valeria Dowding).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.