Monopoly, asymmetric information, and optimal environmental taxation
AbstractThis paper aims to examine optimal environmental taxation in an incomplete-information two-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces and pollutes. It is assumed that the polluting firm is privately informed about its costs of production, and the policymaker, which can only infer the firm's costs from observing the output produced in the first period, has the chance to set environmental taxes to affect emissions; the emitter of pollution may then choose a non-optimal level of production in such a period in order to manipulate the policymaker's beliefs concerning its costs. If the policymaker values environmental quality sufficiently, the low-cost polluter has an incentive to misrepresent itself as a high-cost firm in order to secure a low environmental tax in the second period. This leads the high-cost polluting firm to produce, in the first period, an output level that is not higher than output which would be optimal if only short-term considerations were taken into account. The optimal environmental tax rate in the first period, when the firm's output is a signal of its cost, is then lower than or equal to what it would be if the firm's output was not a signal of firm's costs. The expected emissions in the former context are also lower than or equal to those in the latter case. By contrast, when the policymaker's valuation of the environment is sufficiently low, the environmental tax is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) in both the signaling and non-signaling contexts and no less in the former context than in the latter.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2005/08.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Environmental tax and subsidy policy; monopolistic polluting firm; vertical asymmetric information; signaling and non-signaling;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2005-05-23 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-05-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2005-05-23 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2005-05-23 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2005-05-23 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2005-05-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-05-23 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Barigozzi, Francesca & Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2006.
"The signaling effect of tax policy,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/5402, Paris Dauphine University.
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- Ulph, Alistair, 1996. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-281, May.
- A. Bovenberg, 1999. "Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: an Updated Reader's Guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 421-443, August.
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