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Endogenous social influence in an experimental dilemma game

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Abstract

We study whether people's behavior in a one-shot sequential public goods type situation is affected by social information about average behavior by others in the same situation. The kind of social information we consider does not directly affect subjects' payoffs and we are, therefore, able to separate pure social influence from more conventional distributional effects. We find clear evidence for other-regarding preferences; a specific patterns that we identify is that the more generous a subject, the more reciprocal his responses to others' actions. However, there is very little indication of social influence in our data. The results suggest that current static models of social preferences need not take into account the effect of social influence.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number 2004/59.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_59

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Keywords: Social information; experimental economics; social dilemmas;

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References

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  1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
  2. Ben-Ner, Avner & Putterman, Louis & Kong, Fanmin & Magan, Dan, 2004. "Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 333-352, March.
  3. Iris Bohnet & Richard Zeckhauser, 2004. "Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining," CREMA Working Paper Series, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 2004-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Muren, Astri, 2002. "Discrimination by Gender and Social Distance," Research Papers in Economics, Stockholm University, Department of Economics 2002:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  5. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Brandts, J. & Charness, G., 1998. "Hot Vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 424.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June.
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  9. Gary Bolton, 1998. "Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 257-281, December.
  10. Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok, 2000. "How strategy sensitive are contributions?," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 367-387.
  11. S. N. Durlauf, . "A Framework for the Study of Individual Behavior and Social Interactions," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty 1220-01, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  12. Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April.
  13. Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 1998. "Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics archive-37, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  14. Ingrid Seinen & Arthur Schram, 2001. "Social Status and Group Norms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 01-003/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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Cited by:
  1. Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Sefton, Martin, 2012. "Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences?," IZA Discussion Papers 6345, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2010. "The Impact of Social Camparisons of Reciprocity," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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