The Shapley value for bicooperative games
AbstractThe aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2004/56.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Bicooperative games; Shapley value.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-22 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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