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A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees

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Author Info
Daniel J. Seidmann () (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
Abstract

We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. If the agenda is binary or outsiders are symmetric then a private committee reaches decisions which better serve organizational goals than either a public committee or a randomly chosen committee member; whereas symmetric outsiders are best served by a public committee. The voting patterns of both private and public committees may fail Duverger’s Law, but they both satisfy a weaker condition: Dissidents in private [resp. public] committees all vote decisions which better [resp. worse] serve organizational goals than the plurality decision; so single-peakedness implies that all dissents lie on one side of the plurality decision.

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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-06.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-06

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  1. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. DanielJ. Seidmann, 2008. "Optimal Quotas in Private Committees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 16-36, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

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