On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests

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On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests

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Alex Possajennikov () (University of Nottingham)

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Alex Possajennikov

Abstract

The evolutionary stability of payoff-maximizing preferences in the model of indirect evolution in symmetric games depends on the slope of the reaction function being zero at equilibrium. The application of this result to contests confirms that in two-player contests the optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize principal's payoff while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from principal's payoff maximization. Further examples are also discussed.

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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008-15.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2008-15

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-01-10 (All new papers)
NEP-CTA-2009-01-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
NEP-GTH-2009-01-10 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Alex Possajennikov, . "Commitment in Symmetric Contests," Discussion Papers 08/13, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2007. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 251-286, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 461-470. [Downloadable!]
Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "What to Maximize If You Must," Game Theory and Information 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2002. "What to Maximize if You Must," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000063, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Chris Shannon, 2003. "What to Maximize if You Must," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000044, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2002. "What to Maximize If You Must," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1052, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- HEIFETZ, Aviad & SHANNON, Chris & SPIEGEL, Yossi, 2003. "What to maximize if you must," CORE Discussion Papers 2003047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Krakel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 119-136. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Alex Possajennikov, . "Commitment in Symmetric Contests," Discussion Papers 08/13, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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