On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests
AbstractThe evolutionary stability of payoff-maximizing preferences in the model of indirect evolution in symmetric games depends on the slope of the reaction function being zero at equilibrium. The application of this result to contests confirms that in two-player contests the optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize principal's payoff while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from principal's payoff maximization. Further examples are also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008-15.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
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delegation; indirect evolution; contests;
Other versions of this item:
- Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests," Discussion Papers 2008-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-01-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-10 (Game Theory)
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- Alex Possajennikov, 2009.
"Commitment in symmetric contests,"
AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 375-383.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alex Possajennikov).
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