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The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

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  • Simon Gaechter

    ()
    (University of Nottingham)

  • Benedikt Herrmann

    ()
    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is substantial punishment of high contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007-11.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-11

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Keywords: social norms; free riding; misdirected punishment; experiments;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ruffle, Bradley J. & Tobol, Yossef, 2014. "Honest on Mondays: Honesty and the temporal separation between decisions and payoffs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 126-135.
  2. David L. Dickinson & Daivd Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners," Working Papers 14-02, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  3. David Dickinson & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas. An Experiment with Police Commissioners," Working Papers halshs-00996511, HAL.
  4. Gioia de Melo & Matías Piaggio, 2012. "The perils of peer punishment. Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment," Documentos de Trabajo basados en Monografías (students working papers) 12-16, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  5. Marco Faillo & Daniela Grieco & Luca Zarri, 2010. "Legitimate Punishment, Feedback, and the Enforcement of Cooperation," Working Papers 16/2010, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  6. Akay, Alpaslan & Karabulut, Gökhan & Martinsson, Peter, 2011. "The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 6179, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca, 2012. "Cultural Diversity, Cooperation,and Anti-social Punishment," AICCON Working Papers 102-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
  8. Dickinson, David & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners," IZA Discussion Papers 8218, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Thöni, Christian, 2011. "Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment," Economics Working Paper Series 1111, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  10. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power," Discussion Papers 2012-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  11. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior," Working Papers 0545, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  12. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
  13. Angelo Antoci & Luca Zarri, 2011. "Punish and Perish?," Working Papers 2011.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  14. Tore Ellingsen & Benedikt Herrmann & Martin A. Nowak & David G. Rand & Corina E. Tarnita, 2012. "Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA," CESifo Working Paper Series 4042, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Uwe Dulleck & Jonas Fooken & Yumei He, 2012. "Public Policy and Individual Labor Market Discrimination: An Artefactual Field Experiment in China," QuBE Working Papers 002, QUT Business School.
  16. Mieke Meurs, 2013. "What Makes a Farmer? The Limited Expansion of Commercial Farming Among Bulgarian Smallholders," Working Papers 2013-08, American University, Department of Economics.
  17. Ulrik H. Nielsen, 2014. "Parents' Education and their Adult Offspring's Other-Regarding Behavour," Discussion Papers 14-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  18. Daniela Grieco & Marco Faillo & Luca Zarri, 2013. "Top Contributors as Punishers," Working Papers 24/2013, University of Verona, Department of Economics.

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