Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games

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Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games

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Vincent Anesi () (University of Nottingham)

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Vincent Anesi

Abstract

This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, which form a strategically stable set of equilibria, when voters are suciently farsighted; thus establishing a relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games.

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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007-09.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-09

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Paper
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2007-11-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-GTH-2007-11-24 (Game Theory)
NEP-POL-2007-11-24 (Positive Political Economics)

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Other versions:
- Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey, 2007. "The Dynamics of Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers 1451, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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