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A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees

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Author Info
Daniel Seidmann () (University of Nottingham)
Abstract

We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. We characterize the voting pattern and performance in both committees; and we test these implications on the voting patterns of monetary policy committees.

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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2006-07.

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Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-07

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  4. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & McGregor, Rob Roy & Vermilyea, Todd, 2004. "Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 407-22, June.
  5. Professor Lars E O Svensson, 2001. "Independent review of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 64, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2004. "Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(2), pages 299-313, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16, pages 321-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
  12. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-273, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Ellen E. Meade, 2005. "The FOMC: preferences, voting, and consensus," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 93-101. [Downloadable!]
  16. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge-Murcia, 2007. "Preference heterogeneity in monetary policy committees," DNB Working Papers 157, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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