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Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

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Author Info
Laurent Muller (University of Nottingham)
Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham)
Richard Steinberg (IUPUI)
Lise Vesterlund (University of Pittsburgh)

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Abstract

We present an experiment investigating why contributions decline in repeated public goods games. To distinguish between alternative explanations for this decrease we use a strategy method to elicit strategies in a simple two-stage public goods game. By repeating the game with new opponents participants have the opportunity to learn across games. We find that the behavior elicited using the strategy method is consistent with that of a direct response version of the game. Contributions in stage two are around 45% lower than contributions in stage one. While this pattern of declining contributions is robust across repetitions of the two-stage game, the participants’ strategies are not. Changes in individual strategies across successive repetitions sometimes increase and sometimes decrease stage-one contributions, on average contributions decrease by 7% per game. Thus experience with the game leads to an erratic and less pronounced deterioration in contributions, compared with the systematic and more marked deterioration generated by submitted strategies.

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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2005-13.

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Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2005-13

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Claudia Keser, 2000. "Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  3. repec:att:wimass:19199811 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Croson, Rachel T. A., 1996. "Partners and strangers revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 25-32, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, 2006. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 2011, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Simon Gaechter & Elke Renner, 2006. "The Effects of (Incentivized) Belief Elicitation in Public Good Experiments," Discussion Papers 2006-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bernd Irlenbusch & Gabriele K. Ruchala, 2006. "Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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