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Stability of tacit collusion agreements in the Latin American inflationary environment

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Author Info
Rutelly Marques da Silva
Paulo Brígido Rocha Macedo ()
Gastão Braga
Abstract

An inflationary environment affects the consumers' ability to distinguish between relative price changes and the generalized increase in prices observed in the economy, bringing about implications for cartel stability. We propose a framework to analyze how inflationary uncertainty, interacting with real demand shocks, plays a role in increasing cartel stability. In particular, we derive the result that the minimum value of the real demand shock able to induce firms to deviate from the collusion tacit agreement - modeled in a repeated game context - is an increasing function of the inflationary uncertainty. Other things equal, inflationary uncertainty brings about more stability to collusion tacit agreements. We illustrate how both real demand shocks and inflationary uncertainty play a role in cartel stability by analyzing empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy. Because of the implementation of stabilizing plan Real in 1994, we consider statistical evidence regarding two periods, 1986-1994 and 1995-2000. The results show that inflationary uncertainty affects positively cartel stability whereas real demand shocks have the opposite effect in 1986-1994 - years of high inflation.

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Paper provided by Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais in its series Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG with number td207.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cdp:texdis:td207

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Related research
Keywords: Brazil inflationary uncertainty collusion Real Plan

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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