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Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism

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Joel Sobel

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Abstract

Given n agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. It is shown that any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 98-17.

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Date of creation: Jul 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:98-17

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  1. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200305, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution," MPRA Paper 2637, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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