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On the Dynamics of Standards

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Author Info
Joel Sobel

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Abstract

This paper models the process of promotion or entry into a club. The paper studies a two-parameter family of promotion models. Promotion requires that at least n of the N judges think that the candidate is at least as good as r of the R members in the current group of promoted agents. Candidates minimize the cost of acquiring a D dimensional characteristic, subject to being able to satisfy the promotion criteria. I assume that they must specialize in one characteristic. Under weak assumptions governing which agents leave and the preferences of candidates who arrive, standards decline over time if n/(N+1)(D-1)/D. If the population of promoted agents must contain one agent specializing in each dimension, then standards decline if n/Nr/R.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 97-15r.

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Date of creation: Sep 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:97-15r

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Findlay, David W & Reid, Clifford E, 1997. "Voting Behavior, Discrimination and the National Baseball Hall of Fame," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 562-78, July.
  2. Nalebuff, Barry J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Information, Competition, and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 278-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Costrell, Robert M, 1994. "A Simple Model of Educational Standards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 956-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 1998. "Voting for Voters: a Model of Electoral Evolution," Papers 9822, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
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  6. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Betts, Julian R, 1998. "The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 266-75, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. Gary Biglaiser & James Friedman, 2004. "Membership Diversity in Club Decisions," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1188-1188. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rick Harbaugh & John W. Maxwell & Beatrice Roussillon, 2006. "The Groucho Effect of Uncertain Standards," Working Papers 2006-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Miller, Alan D., . "Separation of decision in group identification," Working Papers 1249, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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