This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jason M. Shachat

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. First, the experimental design allows one to identify the causes of the serial correlation in subjects' action choices. Second, the design allows one to discriminate among a set of mixed strategies which generate distributions over actions and wins similar to the distributions generated by the minimax strategy. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for eliciting mixed strategies, which overcomes some of the difficulties with previous experimental attempts to directly observe mixed strategies. The results clearly show that subjects' choices do not coincide with their minimax strategies, and that players' intended behavior is not minimax. Analysis of the data also reveals that subjects adopt a wide variety of strategies. It is shown that this heterogeneity can rationalize some of the features of the aggregate data that are consistent with the predictions made by the minimax hypothesis.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://weber.ucsd.edu/pub/econlib/dpapers/ucsd9637.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 96-37.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:96-37

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
Phone: (858) 534-3383
Fax: (858) 534-7040
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsdecon/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Teck H Ho & Colin Camerer & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003. "Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000514, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003. "Learning about Learning in Games through Experimental Control of Strategic Interdependence," Experimental 0310003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Steven Scroggin, 2004. "Bounded Rationality in Randomization," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2003-13, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game," Working Papers 326, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Killion, M. Ulric, 2009. "Relation of Game Theory to Economic History and Marginalism," MPRA Paper 13378, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. John Wooders & Jason M. Shachat, 1997. "On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 97-34, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.