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On Reputation Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs

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Author Info
Pierpaolo Battigalli
Joel Watson

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 95-26.

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Date of creation: May 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:95-26

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  1. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Colin Camerer & Teck H Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong & Keith Weigelt, 2003. "Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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