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Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency

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Author Info
Joel Sobel

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 93-17.

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Date of creation: May 1993
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:93-17

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  1. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  2. Brian Skyrms, 2003. "Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000799, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Joerg Oechssler, 1993. "Competition among Conventions," Game Theory and Information 9312001, EconWPA, revised 04 Dec 1993. [Downloadable!]
  4. Karl H. Schlag, . "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "Decentralization and the Coordination Problem," Game Theory and Information 9403004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Discussion Paper 30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-3.

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