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• Theodore Francis Groves Jr.
• Montserrat Viladrich-Grau

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 92-48.

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Date of creation: Nov 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:92-48

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1. Beavis, Brian & Walker, Martin, 1983. "Random wastes, imperfect monitoring and environmental quality standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 377-387, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Burrows, Paul & Rowley, Charles & Owen, David, 1974. "The economics of accidental oil pollution by tankers in coastal waters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 251-268, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
4. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.
6. Cohen, Mark A., 1986. "The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "Collusion through Insurance: Sharing the Cost of Oil Spill Cleanups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 249-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1989. "Collusion Through Insurance: Sharing the Costs of Oil Spill Cleanups," Economics Working Papers 89-111, University of California at Berkeley.

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