An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination

Author Info

Vincent P. Crawford

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Vincent P. Crawford

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 89-28r.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:89-28r

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
Phone: (858) 534-3383
Fax: (858) 534-7040
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsdecon/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 25-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers 00-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Barry Sopher & Andrew Schotter, 2000. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics," Departmental Working Papers 200021, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
J. Van Huyck & R. Battalio & F. Rankin, 1996. "On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 548, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Silverberg,Gerald, 1997. "Evolutionary modeling in economics : recent history and immediate prospects," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2934, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Discussion Papers 0203-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, . "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 01-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andrew Schotter & Barry Sopher, 2003. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 498-529, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Weel,B.J.,ter, 1997. "Cybertax," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Soete,Luc & Weel,Bas,ter, 1998. "Cybertax," Research Memoranda 017, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2004. "A Change Would Do You Good . . . An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 606.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001. "Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory," Vienna Economics Papers 0110, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, 2004. "Cournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-217, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
James E. Rauch, 1993. "Does History Matter Only When it Matters Little? The Case of City-Indu try Location," NBER Working Papers 4312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- James E. Rauch, 1993. "Does History Matter Only When it Matters Little? The Case of City-Industry Location," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Rauch, James E, 1993. "Does History Matter Only When It Matters Little? The Case of City-Industry Location," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 843-67, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Albert Díaz-Aguilera & Alex Arenas & Conrad J. Pérez & Fernando Vega Redondo, 2001. "Self-Organized Criticality In Evolutionary Systems With Local Interaction," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Arenas, Alex & Diaz-Guilera, Albert & Perez, Conrad J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2002. "Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2115-2142, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? The most prolific authors have over 400 items listed on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.