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Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide and Seek" Games

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Author Info
Vincent Crawford (University of California, San Diego)
Nagore Iriberri (University of California, San Diego)

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Abstract

Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller elicited subjects' initial responses to games in which a Hider and a Seeker choose simultaneously among four locations, with the Seeker winning a given amount if he chooses the same location as the Hider and the Hider otherwise winning that amount. The game has a unique equilibrium, in which both players randomize uniformly over locations; but the design framed locations non-neutrally and subjects deviated systematically from equilibrium in ways that were highly sensitive to the framing. This paper compares alternative explanations of the results and proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to explain them

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=ucsdecon
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 2004-12.

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Date of creation: 29 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2004-12

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Related research
Keywords: Experimental Game Theory; Framing Effects; Focal Points; Bounded Rationality; Strategic Sophistication;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2004. "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000316, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Camerer, Colin F. & Knez, Marc & Weber, Roberto A., 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games," Working Papers 970, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford, 2004. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000113, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Palfrey, Thomas R. & McKelvey, Richard D., . "The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2X2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria," Working Papers 991, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Weber, Roberto A., 2000. "The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 523-548, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Weizsacker, Georg, 2003. "Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 145-171, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rapoport, Amnon & Boebel, Richard B., 1992. "Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 261-283, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. A. Rubinstein, 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s4, Economics Department, Princeton University.
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  13. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    Other versions:
  19. Scharlemann, Jorn P. W. & Eckel, Catherine C. & Kacelnik, Alex & Wilson, Rick K., 2001. "The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 617-640, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Rubinstein, A. & Tversky, A., 1993. "Naive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games," Papers 17-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  22. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Selten, Reinhard, 1998. "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-73, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Erik Wengström, 2008. "Price competition, level-k theory and communication," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(66), pages 1-15. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vince P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000454, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Esteban F. Klory & Eyal Winter, 2006. "On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000451, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Camerer, Colin F. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rogers, Brian W., 2006. "Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies," Working Papers 1260, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wengström, Erik, 2007. "Setting the Anchor: Price Competition, Level-n Theory and Communication," Working Papers 2007:6, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ashok S Guha & Brishti Guha, 2005. "Trade, Growth and Increasing Returns to Infrastructure: The Role of the Sophisticated Monopolist," Working Papers 19-2005, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Colin F. Camerer & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers, 2006. "Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000193, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford, 2004. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000113, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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