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Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Mikhail Klimenko
Garey Ramey
Joel Watson
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This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and as a consequence cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions. By using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties, enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation, despite the lack of any coercive power. The occurrence of costly trade disputes, and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses, depend on the adaptability of enforcement institutions in their use of information.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number
2001-01.
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Date of creation: Jan 2001Date of revision:
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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