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Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Miguel Costa-Gomes
Vincent P. Crawford
Bruno Broseta

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Abstract

This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. We studied subjects' initial responses to normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information, while recording their searches. Monitoring subjects' information searches along with their decisions allows us to better understand how their decisions are determined, and subjects' deviations from the search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number 2000-02r.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2000-02r

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References listed on IDEAS
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  6. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent Crawford & Bruno Broseta, 1998. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 98-22, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1989. "The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies," Discussion Papers 853, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994. "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Harless, David W & Camerer, Colin F, 1994. "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1251-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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