Separating the Hawks from the Doves âˆ—
AbstractHuman players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These ï¬ndings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt2zm6c64m.
Date of creation: 22 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Evolutionary dynamics; Hawk-Dove game; game theory; laboratory experiment; continuous time game.;
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- Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
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