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Labor Market Rigidities And The Political Economy Of Trade Protection

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Author Info
Xenia Matschke (University of California Santa Cruz)

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Abstract

Labor market rigidities are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities (such as influential trade unions and high unemployment benefits), that are prevalent in continental European countries, into the well-known Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for sale model, which has emerged as the leading model in the political economy of trade protection literature. I show that contrary to commonly held views, these labor market rigidities do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=ucscecon
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1018.

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Date of creation: 31 Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1018

Note: oai:cdlib1.org:ucscecon-1018
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Keywords: Tariffs; trade protection; protection for sale; labor market.;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, 1989. "Can Inter-Industry Wage Differentials Justify Strategic Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 2739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S3-S39, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. " Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998. "Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Xenia Matschke & Shane Sherlund, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series 1024, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990. "Export Subsidies as an Outcome of the Management-Labor Conspiracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 803-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. John K. Hill, 1984. "Union Wage Distortions and the Size and Efficiency of the Optimal Tariff," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 17(1), pages 146-55, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Martín Rama & Guido Tabellini, . "Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies," Working Papers 94, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Xenia Matschke & Shane Sherlund, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1029, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Xenia Matschke, 2005. "Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries," Working papers 2005-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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