Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups

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Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups

Author Info

Daniel Friedman (University of California Santa Cruz Dept. of Economics)
Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz)

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Abstract

We discuss how small group interactions overcome evolutionary problems that might otherwise erode vengefulness as a preference trait. The basic viability problem is that the fitness benefits of vengeance often do not cover its personal cost. Even when a sufficiently high level of vengefulness brings increased fitness, at lower levels, vengefulness has a negative fitness gradient. This leads to the threshold problem: how can vengefulness become established in the first place? If it somehow becomes established at a high level, vengefulness creates an attractive niche for cheap imitators, those who look like highly vengeful types but do not bear the costs. This is the mimicry problem, and unchecked it could eliminate vengeful traits. We show how within-group social norms can solve these problems even when encounters with outsiders are also important.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1017.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1017

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Paper
- Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-02-01 (All new papers)
NEP-EVO-2005-02-01 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-PKE-2005-02-01 (Post Keynesian Economics)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2002. "Equilibrium Vengeance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]

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