This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pranab Bardhan (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)
Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=ucscecon
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1011.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1011

Note: oai:cdlib1.org:ucscecon-1011
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Santa Cruz, CA 95064
Phone: (831) 459-2743
Fax: (831) 459-5077
Email:
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucscecon/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: inequality self-enforcing collective action infrastructure

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.