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Ideal Bootstrapping and Exact Recombination: Applications to Auction Experiments

Author

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  • Bergstrom, Carl T.
  • Bergstrom, Ted C
  • Garratt, Rod

Abstract

We provide simple formulas that can be used to calculate ideal bootstrap or exact recombination estimates of group statistics from experimental data.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergstrom, Carl T. & Bergstrom, Ted C & Garratt, Rod, 2009. "Ideal Bootstrapping and Exact Recombination: Applications to Auction Experiments," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4xb7454q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt4xb7454q
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mullin, Charles H. & Reiley, David H., 2006. "Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 159-182, January.
    2. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 171-198.
    3. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-673, June.
    4. Diane L. Evans & Lawrence M. Leemis & John H. Drew, 2006. "The Distribution of Order Statistics for Discrete Random Variables with Applications to Bootstrapping," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 18(1), pages 19-30, February.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Applying Auction Theory to Economics," Economics Series Working Papers 1, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodney Garratt & John Wooders, 2010. "Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 43-50, August.

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