Does Mother Nature Punish Rotten Kids?

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Does Mother Nature Punish Rotten Kids?

Author Info

Ted Bergstrom (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Carl Bergstrom (University of Washington, Zoology Dept)

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Abstract

The theory of parent-offspring conflict predicts that mothers and their offspring may not agree about how resources should be allocated among family members. A kid, for example, may favor a later weaning date than does its mother. Despite the mother's physical superiority, it may be that the kid is able to manipulate her behavior. In this paper, we investigate a two-locus population genetic model of weaning conflict in which offspring can attempt to extort resources from their parents by reducing their own chances of survival if their demands are not met. We find that the frequency of recombination between the genes controlling parental behavior and those controlling juvenile behavior determines the evolutionaryoutcome of this genetic conflict. When these genes are tightly linked, the offspring is likely to act so as to further the parents' reproductive interests. When they are not, offspring can successfully "blackmail" their parents into providing additional resources.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number 1999A.

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Date of creation: 26 Jan 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:1999a

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Paper
- Ted Bergstrom & Carl Bergstrom, 2001. "Does Mother Nature Punish Rotten Kids?," Game Theory and Information 0106004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1995A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," ELSE working papers 017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Ted Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," Papers _023, University of Michigan, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," UCLA Economics Working Papers 402, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," Working Papers 650, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
Browning, Martin, 1992. "Children and Household Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 1434-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Theodore C Bergstrom, 2003. "An Evolutionary View of Family Conflict and Cooperation," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000443, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Theodore Bergstrom, 2003. "An Evolutionary View of Family Conflict and Cooperation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 2003D, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
Donald Cox, 2003. "Private Transfers within the Family: Mothers, Fathers, Sons and Daughters," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 605, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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