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On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy

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Author Info
Ted Bergstrom (University of California, Santa Barbara)

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Abstract

A famous paper by Conrad and Meyer calculates that on the eve of the American Civil War, slave prices were about equal to the present values of the slaves' labor services. They argue that this is evidence for the proposition that ordinary economic forces, without political intervention were not likely to put an end to slavery.I wrote this paper when pretty much the only economics that I knew was 1) how to prove the existence of competitive general equilibrium. 2) how to calculate present values. So the paper does two things. It shows how to apply Arrow-Debreu type existence theory to an economy with slavery. (this involved some technical wrinkles that were not in the existing existence literature.) More importantly, it argues that the calculations of Conrad and Meyer showed only that capital markets for slaves were working pretty well, but were not direcly relevant to the question of whether slavery as an institution was economically viable. To answer the latter question, we need to calculate two things. 1) Does an infant slave have positive present value? [If not, reproduction would be discouraged.] 2) Would a freed adult slave, perhaps because of the better incentives and opportunities for free people, be able to earn more than enough on the labor market to repay his or her market price to a slaveowner. I investigate the latter two questions empirically. The answer to the first question is "Yes". Spotty evidence suggests that the answer to the second question was also often "Yes."

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number 1971A.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1971
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:1971a

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Related research
Keywords: Slavery; competitive equilibrium; economic history;

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  1. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1990. "Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers 871, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hammond, Peter J., 2007. "History : Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 808, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 401, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Saito, Tetsuya, 2005. "Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South," MPRA Paper 181, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
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