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How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

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Author Info
Gary Charness (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Guillaume Frechette (Ohio State University)
John Kagel (Ohio State University)

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Abstract

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change--whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=ucsbecon
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number 10-03.

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Date of creation: 23 Jul 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:10-03

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Pereira, Paulo T. & Silva, Nuno & Silva, Joao Andrade e, 2006. "Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 406-422, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paulo Trigo Pereira & Nuno Silva & João Andrade e Silva, 2002. "Positive and negative reciprocity in labor market," Working Papers 2002/03, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2004. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-100/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "The Currency of Reciprocity - Gift-Exchange in the Workplace," IEW - Working Papers iewwp377, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  3. Healy, Paul J., 2004. "Fairness, or just gambling on it? An experimental analysis of the gift exchange game," Working Papers 1183, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting," IZA Discussion Papers 1191, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Marius Brülhart & Jean-Claude Usunier, 2004. "Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Noise in Trust Games," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.15, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Uri Gneezy & John A. List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," NBER Working Papers 12063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Dennis A.V. Dittrich & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange: The Impact of Loss Aversion," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-34, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fehr, Ernst, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," IZA Discussion Papers 3895, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Evidence from Experimental Markets," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 13-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  10. Timothy N. Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?," Economics Working Papers 0055, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  11. John A. List, 2005. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," NBER Working Papers 11616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Lazzarini, Sergio G., 2002. "Moving out of Committed Relationships," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_31, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2005. "Fairness and Contract Design," Discussion Papers 67, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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