1. Jeannette Brosig & Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann, 2002. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-17, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 217-241, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March. [Downloadable!]
3. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 21-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
5. Croson, Rachel & Boles, Terry & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2003. "Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 143-159, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1999-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 99-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9905, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Segal, Uzi & Sobel, Joel, 2007. "Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 197-216, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Nyarko, Yaw & Schotter, Andrew, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs," Working Papers 98-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2005. "Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 151-169, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games," General Economics and Teaching 0407002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 07-04, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1062, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
10. Joel Sobel, 2005. "Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 392-436, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-50, April.
13. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-25, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 1997. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series 1997:28, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Dufwenberg, M. & Lundholm, M., 1997. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Papers 1997-28, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
17. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
18. Michael Bacharach & Gerardo A. Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo, 2001. "Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study," Economics Series Working Papers 076, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
19. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Dufwenberg, Martin, 2002. "Marital investments, time consistency and emotions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 57-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Promises, Threats and Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 397-420, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers iewwp006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
25. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
26. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CEPR Discussion Papers 2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," IEW - Working Papers iewwp072, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," Discussion Papers in Economics 18, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
27. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
28. Forsythe, Robert & Lundholm, Russell & Rietz, Thomas, 1999. "Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(3), pages 481-518.
29. Loewenstein, George, 1999. "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F23-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
32. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
33. Boles, Terry L. & Croson, Rachel T. A. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2000. "Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 235-259, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Huang, Peter H & Wu, Ho-Mou, 1994. "More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 390-406, October.
36. Farrell, Joseph & Rabin, Matthew, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-18, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
37. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
38. Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002. "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, . "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp018, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • V. Anderhub & S. Gächter & M. Königstein, . "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1999-82, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
39. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
40. Blume, Andreas & DeJong, Douglas V. & Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2001. "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 79-120, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
41. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
42. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
43. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2006. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    • Cox, J. & Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S., 2006. "A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1181, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
44. R. Lynn Hannan & John H. Kagel & Donald V. Moser, 2002. "Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 923-951, October. [Downloadable!]
45. Werner Güth & Wolfgang Klose & Manfred Königstein & Joachim Schwalbach, 1998. "An experimental study of a dynamic principal-agent relationship," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4-5), pages 327-341.
46. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
47. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
48. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
49. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 2703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers iewwp075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -- Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Sebastian Kranz, 2006. "Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000092, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Sebastian Kranz, 2006. "Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse11_2006, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
2. Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Zhu-Yu Li & Chaoliang Yang, 2004. "Why People Reject Advantageous Offers – Non-monotone Strategies in Ultimatum Bargaining," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse22_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
3. José Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse9_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • José Apesteguía & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0303, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
   • Apesteguia, Jose & Dufwenberg, Martin & Selten, Reinhard, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Research Papers in Economics 2003:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "Blowing the Whistle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Michele Belot, & V. Bhaskar & Jeroen van de Ven, 2006. "A Public Dilemma: Cooperation with Large Stakes and a Large Audience," Economics Discussion Papers 617, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Werner Güth & René Levínský & Tobias Uske & Thomas Gehrig, 2006. "I want to know: Willingness to pay for unconditional veto power," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-21, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
6. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
7. Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Gueth, 2001. "The Psychological Game of Trust," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
8. Topi Miettinen, 2006. "Promises and Conventions - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
9. Holm, Håkan & Daielson, Anders, 2004. "Fairness and Promises for Sale," Working Papers 2004:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]