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Asymmetric Federalism in India

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Author Info
M. Govinda Rao (National Institute for Public Finance and Policy)
Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz)

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is unequal arrangements and special treatment for some units within Indian federalism, namely. We first explore the conceptual issues the causes and consequences of asymmetric federalism. Next, we trace the evolution of Indian federalism and analyze the factors contributing to the asymmetric arrangements in political, administrative and fiscal relations. We bring out asymmetric arrangements arising from constitutional arrangements or conventions evolved over the years. Recent political developments and asymmetric treatment due to administrative and political exigencies are also analyzed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1031.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:scciec:1031

Note: oai:cdlib1.org:sccie-1031
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Keywords: intergovernmental transfers federalism political bargaining constitutional arrangements

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-28.


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